A Procurement Mechanism for Dynamic Resource Pricing In Cloud Computing
Keywords:
Resource procurement, dynamic pricing, cloud broker, multiattribute auctionsAbstract
Procurement is the acquisition of goods, services or works from an outside external source. We present a cloud resource procurement approach which not only automates the selection of an appropriate cloud vendor but also implements dynamic pricing. Three possible mechanisms are suggested for cloud resource procurement: cloud-dominant strategy incentive compatible (C-DSIC), cloud-Bayesian incentive compatible (C-BIC), and cloud optimal (C-OPT). C-DSIC is dominant strategy incentive compatible, based on the VCG mechanism, and is a low-bid Vickrey auction. C-BIC is Bayesian incentive compatible, which achieves budget balance. C-BIC does not satisfy individual rationality. In C-DSIC and C-BIC, the cloud vendor who charges the lowest cost per unit Quality of Service is declared the winner. We also propose a procurement module for a cloud broker which can implement C-OPT to perform resource procurement in a cloud computing context. In C-OPT, the cloud vendor with the least virtual cost is declared the winner. C-OPT overcome the limitations of both C-DSIC and C-BIC. In additional we also implement the dynamic pricing and enable the link for specified clients.
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